We examine how performance changes at airlines in response to a change in executive incentives.
Introduction
Much of the managerial incentives literature focuses on grants of stock and stock options, and then examines performance measures such as stock or accounting returns. Relatively less explored is how managers respond to incentives to a↵ect specific actions and performance measures. We address this question by looking at the airline industry, and at specifically delineated incentives that have measurable outcomes closely tied to actions. We focus on bonuses provided by airlines to executives for on-time arrival performance. On-time arrival is a key metric for customer satisfaction in the airline industry. 1 Over the past 20 years, virtually every airline has adopted on-time arrival as a measure used in the provision of executive bonuses. Importantly for our empirical study, the introduction of bonuses tied to on-time arrival has been staggered in time across airlines. This allows us to study the e↵ect of introducing a bonus on the performance of the firm that adopts the bonus. 2 Incentive schemes may also be gamed; that is, managers can take actions to make it easier to achieve the bonus but that do not actually result in improved performance. Bennett et al. (2017) show that managers do try to strategically achieve specific compensation targets. In the context of airlines, there are several ways to game an on-time arrival incentive. The most obvious way is to increase the scheduled amount of time for a flight, thus making it easier for flights to arrive on-time and the executives to achieve their bonus. The number of flights scheduled could also be reduced, and flights could be flown with fewer passengers, thus making it easier to arrive on-time. We are able to study the extent to which managers at airlines might game an on-time incentive.
More generally, executives receiving an on-time performance bonus might change the number of scheduled and performed flights in an attempt to turn around the planes faster and meet departure and arrival times. Executives could also introduce changes in the number of passengers and seats available as a way to expedite the boarding and deplaning of passengers, making it easier for the carrier to depart on-time. Thus, we examine changes in capacity, both the number of flights as well as passengers and seats. It is also possible that introducing an on-time incentive might signify a general toughening in competition by an airline. Such an airline might also increase capacity 1 Dresner and Xu (1995) show a strong correlation between delays and customers filing complaints. 2 Our evidence on the actual actions taken by managers to influence on-time arrival is still somewhat indirect. However, the outcomes we observe (whether the flights are on-time) are very closely tied to the incentive (bonuses for improved on-time performance), and thus have less noise between incentive, action, and outcome. and lower prices perhaps anticipating that rivals will accommodate the tougher competitor. We therefore examine changes in prices as well as changes in quantities.
When a firm changes managerial incentives, this may induce or provoke a strategic response from industry competitors. Indeed, firms may alter incentives strategically for precisely this reason (see Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) ). Since on-time performance is a key metric of customer satisfaction, it is also an area in which airlines can and do compete with each other. We are able to see how competitors respond to the introduction of an on-time arrival incentive by rivals. For example, competition in on-time performance may be competition in either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. If competition is in strategic complements, then instituting an on-time arrival incentive may cause both the initiating firm and its rivals to toughen competition, which would increase consumer surplus.
In addition, incentives may be more or less e↵ective in di↵erent market environments. For example, incentives may be less e↵ective in routes where an airline faces competitor airlines, as the competition already disciplines the airline to be more on-time. Similarly, incentives may be more e↵ective in monopoly routes where there is no competitive pressure. We also study the responsiveness of performance to incentives by market environment.
We hand collect data on the specifics of an airline's CEO bonus from the carrier's proxy statements (Form DEF 14A). Data on the airline's on-time performance is from The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). We merge the two datasets to study how an airline's on-time performance has varied in response to changes in incentives based on on-time arrival. We are able to disaggregate on-time performance into departure times, scheduled flight times, actual flight times, and arrival times, thus more precisely seeing how the airline responds to the introduction of the incentive for executives.
We find that when airline executives are given bonuses based on on-time arrival performance, ontime arrival does indeed improve. Delays decrease by up to 2.4 minutes in our preferred specification, or 20 percent, of the average non-negative arrival delay (negative delays are flights arriving early) relative to a carrier without an incentive after saturating our specifications with fixed e↵ects. The fraction of flights delayed fifteen minutes or more (an industry standard definition for a flight being late) decreases by eleven percent relative to the frequency of delayed flights for a carrier without an incentive. Because we see both arrival delays and departure delays, we show that most of the decrease in arrival delays is due to airlines decreasing departure delays-getting departing flights out of the gate closer to on-time. In a separate analysis, when we restrict our sample to problem routes (those routes where more than thirty percent of flights in a quarter are late by fifteen minutes or more), we find that arrival delays shrink by over two minutes, and the fraction of flights delayed by fifteen minutes or more falls by 12.5 percent.
We exploit the staggered introduction of incentives across carriers to more precisely estimate each airline's response to the introduction of an incentive. We use a di↵erence-in-di↵erence specification where we consider an airline before and after introducing an incentive (treated) versus other airlines without an incentive (control) on the same routes. We use three di↵erent approaches.
First, we examine the quarter by quarter response to the treatment for the four quarters prior to the introduction of the incentive and the four quarters after using a dynamic staggered specification. Second, we pool the quarters before and after the treatment to present a staggered di↵erence in di↵erence specification. Third, we examine each airline separately as it introduces an incentive, thus allowing us to examine heterogeneity across airlines. Across each of these approaches, we consistently find that arrival delays fall after the introduction of an incentive.
For strategic gaming, such as increasing the scheduled time of the flights, we find aggregate evidence of such gaming that is generally small in magnitude. On average, carriers with an on-time arrival incentive increase their scheduled minus actual flight times by up to 30 seconds per flight.
These aggregate estimates mask significant heterogeneity. Four carriers-Alaska Airlines, United Airlines, American Airlines, and Delta Airlines-substantially increase their scheduled minus actual time after introducing an incentive. We also find much larger strategic gaming e↵ects as the on-time arrival incentive becomes a larger fraction of the total bonus, i.e., more high powered. 3
In our di↵erence-in-di↵erence specifications, we are also able to examine the e↵ect of the introduction of incentives by one carrier on its competitors that do not have an incentive. We find some evidence that competitors do respond to the introduction of incentives by reducing their delays on the routes on which they compete, even when the executives of the competitors did not receive 3 Discussions with American Airlines executives revealed that carriers incur large unnecessary costs when padding flight times: pilots, flight attendants, gate agents and machinists have to be paid for the extra time, even though they are not really at work; and most importantly, the turnaround time for flights at the gate is severely a↵ected: padding time on several or all flights out of a gate could cost, by the day's end, a flight slot at the gate. Gate slots are among the top airport expenses; losing a flight to padding could be very costly. Thus, there are trade-o↵s associated with padding flight times to achieve an on-time bonus.
bonuses based on their own on-time performance. This is consistent with competition in service quality (on-time performance) being competition in strategic complements. We caution that our results here are smaller in magnitude, and the e↵ect is not present in all specifications.
When both executives of the own and rival airline receive bonuses based on on-time performance, we find that on-time performance on the routes on which they compete improves by a similar amount to when only the own airline has an incentive. Thus, there is little incremental e↵ect from both competitors having an incentive. We also find that the market environment does not have di↵erential e↵ects on the responsiveness of arrival delays to on-time incentives-we find similar e↵ects in both monopoly routes and competitive routes.
Capacity as defined by passengers and seats per flight increases for an airline with an on-time arrival incentive, while the e↵ect on rival carriers without an incentive is generally negligible to negative. The key point here is that airlines with an on-time arrival incentive do not strategically decrease capacity or utilization to make it easier to achieve bonuses. 4 We also find that airlines with on-time arrival incentives lower fares by one percent. Consistent with the increase in capacity and passengers, on-time incentives seem to signify a toughening in competition on several dimensions, but these e↵ects are small in magnitude. 5 We contribute to the literature exploring the relation between managerial incentive-based compensation and non-accounting or stock-based outcomes. 6 The outcomes that we examine are a relatively noise-free transformation of actions managers would take to meet the incentive goal (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Oyer (2004) ). The paper closest to ours is Forbes et al. (2015) .
While their primary focus is on the response of airlines to the introduction of the US Department of Transportation's mandatory disclosure program of flights delayed 15 minutes or more, as part of their analysis, they also consider the introduction of employee bonus programs for reducing arrival delays below the 15 minute threshold. They find heterogeneous e↵ects across carriers: Continental 4 These results are consistent with Dana and Orlov (2014) , who find that over our sample period, load factors for airlines have consistently increased due to Internet use by consumers.
5 Schmidt (1997) , Hermalin (1992) , and Golan et al. (2015) provide theoretical examinations of how increasing product market competition a↵ects a manager's incentive to exert e↵ort. Our paper is also related to the literature that examines the relationship between product quality and product market competition. Mazzeo (2003) explores the relation between airline market concentration and flight delays, and shows that both the prevalence and duration of flight delays are significantly greater on routes where only one airline provides direct service. See also Rupp et al. (2006) , Prince and Simon (2015) , and Ciliberto and Schenone (2012a) .
6 Another example of non-accounting or stock returns-based compensation is the literature on corporate social responsibility contracting, which finds that companies increasingly put weight in executive bonus plans on metrics such as employee satisfaction, safety, or environmental outcomes (see Flammer et al. (2018) We focus on executive bonuses, rather than bonuses for the entire workforce, and find stronger e↵ects, although we also find heterogeneity across carriers. Incentives for executives could be more e↵ective than employee bonuses because executives can use a number of di↵erent levers to influence on-time arrivals beyond employee bonuses, from changing schedules and types of aircraft to concentrating resources where they matter most (e.g., problem routes). As we show below in our discussion of specific incentive plans, employee bonuses are small in magnitude while executive bonuses are typically large. This paper is organized as follows. We describe our data and variable construction in Section 2.
Section 3 presents our econometric specifications, details our identification strategy, and presents our results. Section 4 presents results on several aspects of competition, including the presence of Southwest Airlines, and the e↵ect of incentives on quantities and prices. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Data
We select the airline industry as we have measurable outcomes very specifically tied to actions that respond to the particular incentive given to a manager. Furthermore, the airline industry yields a vast amount data for studying competitive reactions among industry rivals. Airlines compete over many di↵erent routes, and over di↵erent time periods. At any given point in time, a carrier faces di↵erent competitors on di↵erent routes; and for any given route, a carrier is likely to face di↵erent competitors at di↵erent times as carriers enter and exit routes. For example, United Airline's competitors between Denver and San Francisco in the first quarter of 2001 are not the same set of competitors United faces in the route between Dallas-Forth Worth and Newark in the first quarter of 2001. Thus, a carrier's business strategy at a point in time and on one route might di↵er from its strategy on a di↵erent route at the same time; and the strategy on one route might di↵er across time depending on which carriers enter or exit that route (see for example, Berry (1990 ), Brueckner et al. (1992 , and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) ). Therefore, even though we focus on a few airlines, the strategic decision each one makes on any one route during a specific time period is likely to di↵er from the strategic response chosen at the same time but on a di↵erent route where the set of product market competitors is di↵erent.
The airline data in our work is a compilation of di↵erent databases from the O ce of Airline Information at the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). We focus only on domestic flights by publicly-traded US based carriers. The sample ranges from January 1 st , 1993 to December 31 st , 2010 (72 quarters). During this time window, most of the large US carriers instituted an incentive. Data on executive contracts and bonuses are gathered manually using firm proxy statements.
Data Sources and Definitions

Performance Based Incentives
We collect data on CEO bonuses from firm proxy statements (Form DEF 14A accessed from the SEC's website). We read all proxy statements to see if bonuses depend on on-time arrival or performance. Firms generally disclose key measures for firm bonuses. Firms are not required to disclose how much of the bonus depends upon each measure, and there is variability in how much they do so. For those airlines that do report the fraction of the bonus that depends on on-time performance, we collect these data as well. The Committee further adjusted the weighting of the financial and operational goals with 50% tied to financial performance targets and 50% to operational performance targets. The operational performance targets were weighted 67% to relative on-time flight performance and 33% to internal baggage handling improvements.
[bold added]
US Airways provides more explicit information about the on-time performance incentive. In this case, 33.5% of an executive's annual bonus depends on on-time performance. In our empirical work, if an airline introduces an on-time performance incentive for its CEO, then we code that airline as having an incentive an all of its routes.
Airline Performance Data
On-time Arrival and Departure Outcomes
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) collects on-time performance data reported by US certified air carriers that account for at least one percent of domestic scheduled passenger revenues, and reports it in the database named: "Airline On-Time Performance Data." Carriers report daily flight information for the routes they serve. 8 Specifically, it contains scheduled, and actual, departure and arrival times, and scheduled and actual flight times. 9 As we explain below, we collapse this daily flight data to quarterly data for our empirical analysis.
The BTS defines actual arrival time as, "the instance when the pilot sets the aircraft parking brake after arriving at the airport gate or passenger unloading area," and scheduled arrival time as "the scheduled time that an aircraft should cross a certain point (landing or metering fix)."
For each flight, we calculate the minutes of arrival delays as the di↵erence between actual and scheduled arrival times. We aggregate the data to average arrival delays, M eanArrDelay jrt , by a carrier in a route in a quarter. We sum all of the arrival delays across all flights by a carrier in a route in a quarter and divide by the total number of flights by that carrier in that route in that quarter. For most of our analysis, we also adjust for early arrivals, which would have a delay of less than zero. Early arrivals are presumably welcome by passengers, but are not relevant for on-time performance incentives. As a result, we do not include them in the e↵ective measure of delays.
In order to avoid confounding our measure of flight delays with early arrivals, we replace negative arrival delays with 0 delayed minutes before we aggregate up to the route-carrier-quarter unit of observation. Departure delays, MeanDepDelay jrt , are defined similarly. 10
The BTS collects data on actual flight times (length of the flight), and also on scheduled flight times. The latter are reported to the Computer Reservation System (CRS) to allow consumers and travel agencies organize and compare trips. Scheduled and actual flight times are recorded for each 8 A route is a segment in the passenger's itinerary-meaning it is nonstop point-to-point travel. For example, a passenger flying from Boston to Los Angeles via the itinerary BOS-SFO-LAX would have two routes, BOS-SFO and SFO-LAX. Data on on-time performance and capacity is at the route level.
9 These data, as well as the capacity data, are available through the BTS maintained website: http://www.transtats.bts.gov/DataIndex.asp 10 There are several issues we deal with using the raw data from the BTS. First, we eliminate observations for which arrival, departure, as well as actual and scheduled flight times is missing. Second, we drop observations for which arrival delays are more than 600 minutes (10 hours) and early arrivals are more than 180 minutes (3 hours). We also drop observations for which departure delays are more than 600 minutes, and for which early departures exceed 30 minutes.
carrier, for every flight in a given route on a daily basis. For every flight, we calculate the di↵erence between the scheduled flight time and the actual flight time, and call this variable P ad. It denotes the extent to which the scheduled length of a flight exceeds the actual length of a flight in minutes.
The greater is the padding, the easier it is for a flight to arrive on-time. We aggregate the data to get quarterly padding by route and by carrier, P ad jrt , by summing the padding across all flights by a carrier on a route during a quarter and dividing by the number of flights by that carrier on that route in that quarter. 11
Capacity, Utilization, and Price Data
Executives receiving an on-time performance bonus might strategically change the frequency of flights served, or the number of transported passengers, to aid in turning planes around in a more e cient way, thus improving arrival and departure times. To account for this possibility, we study changes in capacity around the time the carriers introduced the performance incentive.
The capacity data are from the T100 Domestic Segment of Form 41-Tra c data provided by the BTS and includes items such as passengers enplaned, seats available, load factors, and number of departures performed and scheduled. This database is not a sample of flights, but a record of all monthly flight segments between an origin and destination airport located within the US boundaries or its territories for US certified air carriers that account for at least one percent of domestic scheduled passenger revenue. These data are at the aircraft type level, i.e., a carrier, on a route, on a given day, flying a specific aircraft (a route can be served with di↵erent aircraft depending on the time of day the flight occurs). As with the on-time performance data, we collapse the data to a quarterly basis and merge it with the on-time performance measure. 12 To collapse the 11 As before, several adjustments need to be done to the raw BTS Data. First, in calculating actual and elapsed times we account for any time zone di↵erences between origin and destination airports. Specifically, we adjust the origin departure time to be the equivalent of the destination time to compute actual flight times as the di↵erence between the actual arrival times and the time-zone-adjusted departure time. Second, we drop flights for which the actual elapsed time is less than 15 minutes, or more than 720 minutes (12 hours).
12 We identify routes that are not served in a consistent manner (e.g., sporadic service between an origin and destination). We drop route-carrier-year-quarter observations for which the quarterly sum of scheduled or performed departures is less than 24 (routes served less than 8 times a month by a carrier), and drop observations for which the quarterly sum of passengers, or seats, is less than 100. We also drop route-carrier-year-quarter observations for which the quarterly sum of scheduled or performed departures is greater than 2,7000 (routes served more than 30 times a day by a carrier), as these observations are likely to be data entry errors. We drop observations for which the route includes either an origin or destination that is not ranked, by the total number of passengers transported, in the top 100 origin and destination airports. These are standard filters in the literature to avoid small, unrepresentative routes that are sporadically served. data, we take the average of the seats available per scheduled flight across all flights on a route by a carrier in that quarter, and the average of the actual number of passengers enplaned per scheduled flight across all flights on a route by a carrier in that quarter. We also take the sum of departures scheduled and the sum of departures performed on a route by a carrier in that quarter. We define quarterly load factor as the ratio of revenue passenger per mile to the available seats per mile on a route by a carrier in that quarter. 13 To examine the impact of incentives on ticket prices, we use itinerary fares obtained from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database, maintained by the BTS. The DB1B is a quarterly, 10% random sample of domestic airline tickets. We apply the standard filters used in the existing literature on airline pricing to construct our price sample. 14 These data include information on the itinerary fare each flown passenger paid during a year-quarter. As in prior literature, we compute the average fare charged by a carrier on a route in a quarter as the carrier's total revenue on that route in that quarter divided by the total number of passengers flown by that carrier in that route in that quarter (itinerary fares are adjusted using the 2008 CPI). 1) None-no carrier on a specific route r in quarter t has an on-time incentive;
Summary Statistics and Econometric Controls
Summary Statistics
2) Own-a specific carrier j on a specific route r in quarter t has an on-time incentive, and no other carrier on route r in quarter t has an incentive;
3) Rivals-at least one competitor carrier to carrier j on route r in quarter t has an on-time incentive, but carrier j does not;
13 The BTS defines a passenger as: "Any person on board a flight who is not a member of the flight or cabin crew," and available seats as "Installed seats in an aircraft (including seats in lounges) exclusive of any seats not o↵ered for sale to the public by the carrier; provided that in no instance shall any seat sold be excluded from the count of available seats."
14 For a detailed explanation of the price data construction, see Dennis et al. (2018) . See also Borenstein (1989) , Berry (1990) , Brueckner et al. (1992) , Borenstein and Rose (1995) , Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) , Ciliberto and Schenone (2012b) , and Snider and Williams (2015) . There has been a significant time trend in airline performance. Through time, airlines have scheduled more flights per day, and capacity utilization or load factor has increased (see Dana and Orlov (2014) ). We remove the e↵ects of the time trend by controlling for year-quarter fixed e↵ects, and present adjusted summary statistics in Panel B. Panel B shows that if there are no on-time incentives for any carrier on a route, then arrival delays are on average 8.22 minutes. If a carrier has an on-time incentive, then its arrival delays are 6.83 minutes, a decrease in delays relative to carriers without an incentive. This is in contrast to Panel A, which did not adjust for time e↵ects. Interestingly, if a carrier's rival on a route has an incentive, then the carrier's delays are 6.49 minutes, possibly suggesting that there is a competitive response to a rival carrier having an incentive.
Finally, if both carriers on a route have an incentive (Joint), then arrival delays are 8.57
minutes. This increase in delays for Joint suggests that there is something di↵erent about these routes. Routes on which two carriers compete and both have an incentive are typically routes that involve at least one major hub, such as Atlanta to Dallas, where Delta and American have hubs, respectively. Hubs are busier and more subject to delays. In our subsequent empirical specifications, we control for hubs by controlling for route-carrier fixed e↵ects, origin · year fixed e↵ects, and destination · year fixed e↵ects. When we do, we no longer find that delays on Joint routes are larger than None routes-in fact, delays decrease.
Departure delays are presented in the second row of Panel B, and again the pattern for departure delays is similar to that of arrival delays (although now the departure delays for Joint are less than the departure delays for None). The di↵erence between the CRS reported scheduled flight time and the actual elapsed flight time, P ad jrt is presented in the third row. Interestingly, in the fourth column for Joint, routes on which both an airline and at least one competitor have an incentive exhibit negative P ad jrt times, indicating that these are routes that are chronically delayed, since actual elapsed times are on average greater than scheduled times. As noted before, these Joint We define problem routes for each carrier as those routes on which a carrier's flights are delayed more than 15 minutes more than 30% of the time prior to the carrier's introduction of the incentive.
We then look at di↵erences in arrival delays before and after the implementation of the incentivePanel D reports these statistics. The left four columns show the average minutes delayed for problem routes, and the right four columns show the frequency with which flights are delayed more than 15 minutes in a problem route. Note that these average delays can be less than 15 minutes and the frequency of delays less than 30% after the introduction of the incentive (the columns for Own and Rivals), since the definition of a problem route is that at least 30% of the flights on that route were delayed 15 minutes or more in the quarter prior to the introduction of an incentive. Delays decrease with the introduction of an incentive by a carrier, and to a lesser extent in minutes, when a rival introduces an incentive. Nonetheless, delays in problem routes seem to be quite persistent, as delays are still elevated after the introduction of an incentive as compared to Panel C. Note that the number of observations in problem routes is much smaller than in the full sample.
Executives receiving an on-time performance bonus might strategically reduce the number of scheduled and performed flights in an attempt to turn around planes faster and meet departure and arrival times. Executives could also introduce changes in the number of passengers and seats available as a way to expedite the boarding and deplaning of passengers, making it easier for the carrier to depart and arrive on-time. We use the capacity data reported in the T100 Domestic Segment database to examine these issues. Regarding departures scheduled and performed, we see a decrease when a carrier introduces an incentive, but this decrease is smaller than the increase in number of passengers per performed flight. In e↵ect, the greater capacity utilization after the introduction of an incentive more than o↵sets the reduction in the number of flights performed. When a carrier without an incentive competes with one that has an incentive (Rivals) and when both a given carrier and at least one competitor on a specific route in that quarter have on-time incentives (Joint), both departures scheduled and performed are much larger in magnitude relative to carriers without an incentive. Panel A, Part 2, reports summary statistics for the sample restricted to problem routes. The data are noisier here due to the smaller sample size. One feature here is that carriers that introduce an incentive generally increase capacity and utilization on the problem routes.
Panel B reports ticket-price statistics. For each route-carrier and year quarter observation, we have a random sample of 10 percent of all itinerary fares. The average fare reported here under each categorical variable is the average P rice jrt across carriers, routes and year quarter observation falling in each category. Fares in all categories are around 200 dollars per itinerary, and fares in problem routes are generally higher than in all routes.
Econometric Controls: Route Presence and Origin and Destination Airport Specific Shocks
To control for the e↵ects that a particular carrier j flying a particular route r can have on its on-time performance we include route-carrier fixed e↵ects u rj . For example, a carrier might fly more modern planes that could impact its on-time performance on one route, and older planes on other routes. This is a route specific e↵ect for a carrier and the route-carrier fixed e↵ect absorbs this variation. As another example, route-carrier fixed e↵ects will incorporate variation due to hub airports, specifically non-time-varying hub e↵ects. Furthermore, if there are sample selection issues that arise when the unobservables that a↵ects a carrier's choice of entering route r are the same unobservables that impact a carrier's on-time performance in that route, but not in others, then route-carrier fixed e↵ects control for this carrier-route selection. 15 We also need to control for whether there are competitors to carrier j serving that same route at the same time. As an example, consider routes on which carrier j competes with Southwest. The presence of Southwest will a↵ect carrier j, regardless of whether carrier j has a performance-based incentive. We want to control for this e↵ect for all competitors, not just Southwest, to carrier j. To control for competitor carrier k 's presence in route r at time t, we define kInRoute rt as a categorical variable equal to one if competitor carrier k is active at time t in route r that carrier j flies. If competitor carrier k is not present in a route, then kInRoute rt equals zero. It is important to note that this set of controls is only identified when a carrier shifts into or out of a route-if a carrier k is always in a route or never in a route throughout our sample, then this e↵ect will not be estimated for that carrier in that route. We refer to these fixed e↵ects as competitor in route fixed e↵ects. The route-carrier fixed e↵ects u rj are distinct from the competitor in route, kInRoute rt , fixed e↵ects. The route-carrier fixed e↵ects pertain to a given carrier j, while the kInRoute rt fixed e↵ects encompass all of j 0 s competitors on a route at time t. The route carrier fixed e↵ects will absorb substantially more variation than the kInRoute rt fixed e↵ects in our data.
There could be origin-and/or destination-specific shocks that can alter the on-time performance of flights involving such origins and destinations. For example, airports undergoing construction or maintenance could see changes in on-time performance or utilization measures associated with the shock to the airport, but unrelated to whether a carrier serving that airport has an incentive.
Therefore, we include origin · year, u oy , and destination · year, u dy , fixed e↵ects. Further, to the extent that either the origin or destination is a hub airport for any carrier, the origin · year and destination · year fixed e↵ects will absorb any time-varying hub e↵ects.
We also include year-quarter fixed e↵ects, u t , that control for performance changes that stem from seasonal and other exogenous shocks that can a↵ect performance outcomes, and can therefore confound the e↵ect of incentives on performance. Year-quarter fixed e↵ects also control for any serially correlated industry-specific shock to demand that can impact performance measures. Note that we are saturating our specifications with thousands of fixed e↵ects when we include the sets of kInRoute rt , route-carrier, origin · year, destination · year, and year-quarter fixed e↵ects. These fixed e↵ects absorb a large amount of variation in our specifications.
Over our sample period, the airline industry saw three important mergers, US Airways-America West, Delta-Northwest, and United-Continental. Consolidation impacts competition and airline behavior (see Kin and Singal (1993) , and Oliver (2003)). In addition, six of our ten airlines have operated under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection during our sample period: Continental, America
West, United, Delta, Northwest, and US Airways (twice). Prior work has shown that Chapter 11 protection alters airline performance and product market competition (see, for example, Borenstein and Rose (1995), Borenstein and Rose (2003) , Ciliberto and Schenone (2012a) ). The combination of route-carrier fixed e↵ects and year-quarter fixed e↵ects fully controls for mergers (specifically, the time between when a merger is completed and when the carriers start jointly reporting on-time statistics to the BTS) and bankruptcy-related e↵ects.
Results
Main Specifications
Our initial specification examines the extent to which the introduction of an on-time incentive influences arrival delays, departure delays, and scheduled -actual times of flights (the amount which the airline pads its schedule). In order to demonstrate the dynamic e↵ects of introducing an incentive, we estimate the following di↵erence in di↵erence specification: 16
where P jrt is one of three on-time measures for carrier j in route r during year-quarter t: nonnegative arrival or departure delays and padding time (CRS scheduled time minus actual elapsed flight time). Quarter q is an indicator equal to one for the q th quarter relative to the introduction of the on-time incentive. The time window is defined by four quarters before the the incentive was implemented and four quarters after the incentive was introduced (the quarter the incentive was implemented is therefore excluded). In this specification, we control for total CEO compensation.
To control for the presence of competitors in a route we include kInRoute rt , which equals 1 if carrier k serves route r at time t. We include route-carrier fixed e↵ects u rj , year-quarter fixed e↵ects u t , origin · year fixed e↵ects u oy , and destination · year fixed e↵ects u dy . Standard errors are clustered at the route-carrier level. The error term is ⇣ jrt . The coe cient estimates of ↵ k represent the change in minutes performance due to the introduction of an incentiveuarters away by treated carriers relative to the change in minutes performance for carriers that did not introduce an ontime incentive (control carriers). The coe cients are dynamic di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimates, quarter-by-quarter, starting from four quarters prior to the introduction of an incentive by treated carriers and going until four quarters after the introduction of the incentive. In this specification we are pooling all of the carriers that introduce an on-time incentive (treated) and all carriers that do not have an incentive at the same calendar time (control), and treat the quarter in which the incentive is initiated as the event quarter (quarter 0). Because we include year-quarter fixed e↵ects, the traditional post treatment indicator in a di↵erence in di↵erence regression is eliminated.
Because we include route carrier fixed e↵ects, the traditional treated indicator is also eliminated.
The results are presented in Table 4 .
To illustrate the dynamic e↵ect of introducing the incentive on on-time performance, Figure 1 plots the coe cients ↵ q . The dashed lines around the coe cient estimates represent the 95 percent confidence interval, adjusted for route-carrier clustering. The first column of Table 4 and the top panel of Figure 1 present results for arrival delays. Prior to the introduction of the incentive (quarters -4 to -1), arrival delays are essentially no di↵erent than arrival delays at quarter 0 for carriers introducing an incentive relative to those that do not. None of the coe cients are significant. This is a test for pre-trends prior to the introduction of the incentive. As can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 1 , there is no pre-trend for carriers introducing an incentive relative to those that do not, alleviating some endogeneity concerns associated with the introduction of the incentive.
After the introduction of the incentive, arrival delays steadily decrease, reaching a reduction in arrival delays of 2.39 minutes in quarter 4 relative to quarter 0 for carriers that introduce an incentive versus those that do not. This reduction in arrival delays is consistent with the incentive working as intended, and is large in magnitude. Recall from Table 2 , Panel C, that the mean non-negative arrival delay for a carrier without an incentive is 11.75 minutes. After four quarters, a 2.39 minute reduction is a 20.3 percent reduction starting from delays of 11.75 minutes.
The second column of Table 4 and the middle panel of Figure 1 present results for departure delays. The results are very similar to those for arrival delays, and reinforce the general point that arrival and departure delays are highly correlated. Flights that depart late will arrive late. The third column of Table 4 and the bottom panel of Figure 1 present results for padding (changes in scheduled -actual flight times). If an airline wanted to strategically game an incentive, increasing the amount of time scheduled per flight would be the most straightforward way to do so. By quarter 4, we do see an increase in padding of 0.50 minutes, or 30 seconds. While this is evidence of strategic gaming, it is not large in magnitude. Table 4 and Figure 1 illustrate the e↵ect of introducing an incentive using a dynamic, staggered di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimator. We can also pool the quarterly data from before and after the introduction of the incentive to present just a staggered di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimator. This estimator gives us in e↵ect a time series average of the coe cients for quarters one through four after the introduction of the incentive. While obviously less rich than the dynamic results in the previous specification, this specification is a useful transition to later carrier-by-carrier results that demonstrate the heterogeneity in our data. We estimate a generalized staggered di↵erence-indi↵erence specification of the type:
P jrt is one of our three on-time measures for carrier j, in route r, at time t. P ost jt , equals 1 if the observation year-quarter t is after carrier j implemented the incentive. Incentive j equals 1 if observation carrier j implemented an on-time arrival incentive within our sample period. The di↵erence-in-di↵erence variable is DID jt = Incentive j · P ost jt . To control for the presence of competitors in a route we include kInRoute rt , which equals 1 if carrier k serves route r at time t.
We also control for the CEO's total compensation. We include year quarter fixed e↵ects and route carrier fixed e↵ects. Note that including year quarter fixed e↵ects eliminates the Post dummy, and including route carrier fixed e↵ects eliminates the Incentive dummy, as it is measured at the carrier level. This leaves the interaction term, which is the DID coe cient. The error term is ⇣ jrt .
The results are in Table 5 . Panel A includes origin · year and destination · year fixed e↵ects.
Panel B replaces origin · year and destination · year fixed e↵ects with origin and destination time trends (Origin rt · T imetrend and Dest rt · T imetrend), where T imetrend takes a value between 1 and 72 corresponding to each quarter in our sample. Panel A corresponds to our previous results in Table 4 . The results in both panels are very similar. Using origin · year and destination · year fixed e↵ects is much more stringent than using origin and destination time trends, as the former uses dramatically more degrees of freedom. This binds later when we report carrier-by-carrier results. The similarity in these two panels suggests that our subsequent carrier-by-carrier results are unlikely to be driven by the use of origin and destination time trends. We report the di↵erence-in-di↵erence coe cient, ↵ DID . The left two columns in both panels present the estimates for arrival and departure delays. Treated carriers reduce their arrival and departure delays from before to after the introduction of the incentive relative to control carriers by over a minute. Depending upon specification, this is about ten percent of the magnitude of delays for carriers without an incentive.
The third and fourth columns show the percentage of flights delayed 15 minutes or more. The fraction of flights delayed 15 minutes or more is reduced by 2.6 percentage points for treated carriers relative to control carriers from before to after the introduction of the incentive. From Table 2 
Carrier-by-Carrier Di↵erences-in-Di↵erences
Our previous results use pooled and staggered di↵erence in di↵erence specifications to isolate the e↵ect of an introduction of an incentive on treated carriers. As an alternative, we can use the richness of our data to examine heterogeneous carrier-by-carrier changes in on-time performance around the introduction of an incentive. Each carrier introduces an on-time arrival incentive at a di↵erent point in time (indeed, Delta introduces and then removes its incentive twice before instituting it permanently). We use this fact to estimate the reduction in arrival delays for a carrier around the introduction of the incentive relative to carriers that do not have an incentive at that time. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to estimate the reduction in arrival delays by carrier at the time of the introduction of the incentive. The disadvantage of this approach is that each carrier's specification uses less of the data, thus limiting our ability to saturate the specifications with fixed e↵ects.
For each of the carriers that institutes an incentive, we select a time window of four quarters before and four quarters after the carrier introduces an incentive. We then select as the control all those carriers that have not introduced an incentive at any time prior to the selected time window.
For example, Delta introduced an incentive in the third quarter of 1997. The only carrier that had an incentive in place before Q3 1997 is Continental, so we include in the control group for Delta all carriers excluding Continental. For carriers that instituted an incentive in the later part of our full sample period, such as US Airways, the set of control carriers is limited to those carriers that
have not yet introduced an incentive within our sample years of 1993-2010, which is essentially Southwest. When Southwest introduces its incentive in 2009, there are no control carriers for the before period (Q1-4 of 2008), and so we cannot estimate our di↵erence-in-di↵erence specification for Southwest. We also deal with carriers that introduce an incentive in overlapping time windows as follows: United, American, and Delta2 all introduce an incentive in Q1 2004. Therefore, none of them is used as a control carrier for the others in this specification. We run a di↵erence-in-di↵erence specification of the type:
P jrt is one of three on-time measures for carrier j, in route r, at time t: minutes of arrival and departure delays and scheduled minus actual flight times. Carrier j is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the observation corresponds to carrier j ; Af ter jt equals 1 if the observation corresponds to the time window after carrier j implements the incentive; Carrier j · Af ter jt is the interaction term that captures that e↵ect on arrival delays following the implementation of the on-time performance incentive, and is the main variable of interest. In this specification, we use origin and destination time trends (Origin rt ·T imetrend and Dest rt ·T imetrend) in place of origin·year and destination· year, as the latter uses too many degrees of freedom when estimating separate carrier-by-carrier regressions. The error term is ⇣ jrt .
Note again that we run specification (3) separately, one for each carrier that receives an incentive, and we include only the carrier that receives the incentive and the carriers that have not yet received the incentive. As we advance in calendar time, the set of carriers without an incentive drops, and hence the set of control carriers falls. The second row reports the di↵erence-in-di↵erence coe cient for departure delays and finds similar e↵ects, although Alaska, United, and Delta3 (in addition to JetBlue) do not show significant reductions in departure delays, while Delta2 does. In the third row, we look at scheduled -actual times. When looking at the di↵erence-in-di↵erence coe cients, some carriers decrease their scheduled -actual times after the incentive and some increase them (strategic gaming). In particular, Alaska, United, American, and Delta3 stand out for strategic gaming by increasing their scheduled -actual times substantially. Interestingly, Delta2 decreases its scheduled -actual time, thus o↵setting its reduction in departure delays and resulting in no change in arrival delays.
This heterogeneity across carriers in strategic gaming shows that responses to the introduction of incentives can be quite nuanced.
Summing up, we can easily see how much of the change in arrival delays is due to reductions in departure delays versus changing the scheduled -actual times (strategic gaming). For example, Delta1 dramatically reduces its arrival delays. Most of this is due to decreasing departure delaysgetting the departing flight out of the gate on-time. However, some of the reduction in arrival delays is also due to increasing the scheduled -actual time of the flights. We next examine how competition shapes the response of carriers to incentives. Our conjecture is that routes on which carriers face competition prior to the introduction of an incentive will show improved on-time performance from the incentive, but less than on routes that are monopoly routes. In e↵ect, competition provides some inherent discipline, while incentives then interact with competition to further improve performance. Monopoly routes, by contrast, are only a↵ected by the incentive, and therefore have more scope for improvement from the incentive. Table 7 again shows the di↵erence-in-di↵erence coe cient for each specification. Panel A of Table 7 considers the e↵ects of incentives on a carrier on those routes where that carrier faces competition from carriers without an incentive. We are excluding monopoly routes, and routes in which both carriers have an incentive. For arrival delays, we generally find similar e↵ects to those in Table 6 with the exceptions that American and Delta3 do not significantly reduce arrival delays.
Departure delays are also similar to what we find in Table 6 with the exceptions of American and Delta2. Interestingly, we find a little more evidence of padding when a treated carrier is on a competitive route, as US Airways also exhibits padding behavior.
Panel B considers what happens on routes in which the carrier has a monopoly. Again, we find similar e↵ects to our overall results. While we initially conjectured that incentives would show larger e↵ects on monopoly routes (since on these routes, there is no competition to discipline performance), we do not see this consistently across carriers. One possibility is that as carriers have relatively more monopoly routes, the disciplinary e↵ect of incentives dominates the disciplinary e↵ect of competition in all subsamples (see Golan, Parlour, and Rajan (2015) . Thus, the e↵ects of the incentive seem to be fairly uniform across di↵erent types of competition (monopoly versus competitive) that carriers face, while the carriers themselves exhibit substantial heterogeneity in their response to the incentive.
In Panel C, we ask how carriers that do not have an incentive respond to a carrier introducing an incentive. In response to the first carriers introducing an incentive, rival carriers reduce their arrival delays, as can be seen in how rivals respond to Continental, Delta, and Alaska introducing incentives. For example, when Delta first introduces an incentive, rivals on the same routes as Delta reduce their arrival delays by 1.41 minutes relative to the rival's routes where they do not compete with Delta. This e↵ect fades for later introductions of incentives, as the number of competitors without incentives shrinks. This can be seen in the reduction of observations across the columns in the panel.
In Table 8 , we repeat the prior di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis, but focus on the frequency of flights delayed 15 minutes or more. The results in Table 8 are similar to those we reported in Table 7 for competition, monopoly routes, and the e↵ects of introducing an incentive on competitor delays.
While we observe some competitive responses from the introduction of on-time incentives, we do not observe substantial di↵erences based on type of competition (monopoly versus oligopoly), while still observing substantial heterogeneity across carriers.
Panel Fixed E↵ects Specifications
We further examine the nature of responses to the introduction of incentives by using all of our panel data, and not just the four quarters before and four quarters after the introduction of incentives.
We estimate a panel fixed e↵ects regression of the type:
P jrt is one of the performance measures for carrier j, in route r, at time t: arrival/departure delays in minutes or percent of flights delayed 15 minutes or more, and scheduled minus actual flight times. We will later also examine available seats, enplaned passengers, load factors, scheduled and actual performed flights, and fares or prices. Own, Rival, and Joint refer to the three categorical variables for whether a carrier on a route has an incentive, whether a rival carrier has an incentive, or both a carrier and its rival have an incentive. To control for a competitor's presence on a route we include kInRoute rt = 1 if carrier k serves route r at time t. We include route-carrier fixed e↵ects u rj , year-quarter fixed e↵ects u t , origin · year fixed e↵ects u oy , and destination · year fixed e↵ects u dy . Finally, ⇣ jrt is an unobservable error term. While this is smaller than our di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimates, here we use all of our sample data, and not just the data in the four quarters before and four quarters after the introduction of the incentive. It is important to note that we are saturating this specification with thousands of fixed e↵ects and controls and still find a significant incentive e↵ect.
For competitors, if a rival airline in the same route initiates an on-time arrival incentive, then the competitor airline that did not introduce the incentive still significantly reduces its arrival delays by 0.34 minutes after controlling for route-carrier fixed e↵ects, origin·year and destination·year fixed e↵ects, total CEO compensation, bankruptcy, mergers, and other carriers flying the same route.
If both airline competitors have an on-time arrival incentive (Joint), then the reduction in delays is 0.56 minutes, similar to the e↵ect of Own. Since our four categories-None, Own, Rivals,and Joint-are mutually exclusive, there is a small incremental benefit from both an airline and its rival having an incentive relative to only an airline or its rival having an incentive. The competitive e↵ect on rival airlines is interesting-in principle, if one airline introduces an incentive, its rival airlines still get the benefit of a reduction in delays even though they do not have an incentive.
Recall that the summary statistics in Table 2 , Panels A through C, showed an increase in delays for Joint relative to None. This increase is reversed in the regression results by controlling for route-carrier fixed e↵ects and origin · year and destination · year fixed e↵ects. 17
The second column of Panel A repeats the analysis for departure delays and finds similar results.
This again demonstrates that arrival delays are mostly caused by departure delays-the reduction in departure delays feeds through to reductions in arrival delays. The third and fourth columns of Table 9 , Panel A, consider the fraction of flights delayed more than 15 minutes. Instituting an on-time arrival incentive is associated with a reduction in the fraction of flights delayed more than 15 minutes by a significant 1 percentage point. For rivals, the reduction in the fraction of flights 17 In the raw data, the large delays for Joint are primarily due to United and American Airlines. These two airlines compete directly at their joint hub O'Hare Airport in Chicago, and both instituted their incentives at the same time. Our regression results control for these e↵ects. delayed more than 15 minutes is not significant. If both competitors on a route have on-time arrival incentives, then the frequency of arrival delays decreases by 2 percentage points for both airlines.
We find similar results for departure delays in the fourth column.
Another possibility is that airlines might try to game the on-time arrival incentive. When faced with a new incentive, executives might strategically increase the scheduled amount of time for a flight. To examine this, we look at the di↵erence between the CRS scheduled flight time and the actual elapsed time for flights, in the fifth column of Panel A, Table 9 . An airline instituting an on-time arrival incentive decreases its scheduled flight time relative to the actual flight times by a statistically insignificant amount, after all of our controls. In other words, introducing an incentive does not appear to result in much strategic gaming in this specification.
For rival airlines, however, there is a statistically significant increase in the amount of time a flight is scheduled for minus the actual flight time of 0.20 minutes, or 12 seconds. Therefore, there is some evidence of strategic gaming by rivals in response to an airline introducing an incentive. If both have an on-time arrival incentive, then both will incrementally increase their scheduled flight times by 0.34 minutes. That both airlines increase their scheduled times on a route in response to both having an incentive could suggest some degree of collusive behavior, but this e↵ect is small in magnitude.
In Panel B of Table 9 , we restrict attention to problem routes. Here we find e↵ects that are larger in magnitude. Having an on-time arrival incentive is associated with a reduction in arrival delays of 2.38 minutes. The e↵ect for rivals is much smaller, and is statistically insignificant. When both have an incentive, there is a reduction in delays of 1.46 minutes, somewhat smaller in magnitude than when only a given carrier has an incentive. All of these e↵ects are similar for departure delays.
In the third and fourth columns, we find that having an incentive is associated with a decrease in the frequency of delayed flights of four percentage points for arrivals and three percentage points for departures. There are no significant e↵ects on rivals. We find smaller e↵ects when both carriers have incentives relative to when a given carrier has an incentive. The e↵ects for Own here are larger in magnitude, and suggest that the incentive is particularly e↵ective in reducing delays below the 15 minute threshold in problem routes.
Finally, for the di↵erence between scheduled and actual flight times, there is an increase associated with having an incentive of 0.82 minutes, so there is some evidence of strategic gaming on problem routes. However, the reduction in departure delays of 1.99 minutes is 2.4 times larger, suggesting that the incentive is also working as intended on these routes by inducing reductions in departure delays that then account for the reductions in arrival delays. For rivals and when both carriers have an incentive, the di↵erence between scheduled and actual flight times is insignificant.
The E↵ects of the Bonus Magnitude
In Table 10 , Panel A, we make use of variation in the size of the incentive. For a subset of our sample, we have data on the fraction of the overall bonus that depends on the on-time incentive.
This ranges from as little as 0.1% up to 33.5% of the overall bonus, with a mean of 10.9% and a standard deviation of 11.8%. In this analysis, we use a continuous measure of the own bonus, and so omit the indicator variables for Own, Rivals, and Joint. 18 The e↵ects here are substantial. In the first column, the coe cient of 13.18 implies that an increase in the fraction of the bonus tied to on-time performance of one standard deviation, 11.8 percentage points, reduces arrival delays by 1.56 minutes. This e↵ect is smaller for departure delays (in the second column), and we find a similar pattern for the percentage of flights delayed 15 minutes or more (in the third and fourth columns). The fifth column shows why: as the size of the incentive increases, carriers increase the scheduled amount of time for flights relative to the actual time required to complete the flights. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of the bonus tied to on-time performance increases the padding time by 17.07 · 0.118 = 2.01 minutes. This is evidence of substantial strategic gaming, as executives have more direct control over the scheduled length of flights, and they increase the scheduled time as more of their bonuses depend on on-time arrival.
We further examine variation in the size of the bonus tied to on-time performance by partitioning the sample into large bonuses and small bonuses. In several cases (American and Alaska), the CEO's bonus tied to on-time arrival was less than one percent of the total bonus. In these cases, the airline instituted an on-time bonus incentive for all employees in which the CEO also participated, but the magnitude of the incentive for all employees was small (typically several hundred dollars per employee). As the CEO received no additional bonus for on-time performance, the standard bonus for all employees amounted to a small fraction (less than one percent) of the CEO's total bonus, which depended more heavily on other factors such as operating income or revenue growth. These cases allow us to examine the impact of small bonuses, as well as whether bonuses for all employees matter versus a large bonus for the CEO. Table 10 Table 10 , Panel B, examines bonus percentages less than one percent. As these magnitudes are small, rather than using the bonus percentage as the independent variable, we simply use the categorical variable Own = 1 if the CEO has an on-time arrival incentive but it equals less than one percent of the CEO's total bonus. The e↵ect of the incentive on arrival delays is insignificant. These results are confirmed for departure delays and padding in the subsequent columns. These results imply that the magnitude of the incentive matters, and importantly, that in this case, top management incentives matter more than incentives for all employees.
Placebo Test
To assess the robustness of our primary results, we perform a placebo test. For each of the carriers, we randomly assign an on-time arrival incentive in any of the 72 quarters that comprise our sample period. The carrier maintains the placebo on-time incentive for all quarters after the randomly assigned quarter of incentive initiation. We then pool the carriers with their placebo random treatments and estimate the e↵ect of the on-time incentive (Own) using the specification from Table   9 , but we omit the categorical variables Rival and Joint. We run 1000 Monte Carlo simulations and report the coe cients and standard errors for this placebo test in Table 11 
Mean Reversion
A potential concern with our results is a specific form of endogeneity. In particular, carriers may introduce an incentive when on-time performance is especially poor. If performance mean-reverts, then we may incorrectly ascribe the performance improvement to the incentive rather than simple mean reversion.
To account for the mean reversion explanation, we use an "Ashenfelter Dip Strategy", where we estimate specifications similar to those in Table 9 , but drop observations from two quarters prior to and two quarters after the introduction of an incentive. 19 The idea is that we compare on-time performance post the introduction of an incentive to at least three quarters prior to the introduction of an incentive, thus removing the e↵ect of the particularly poor quarters that may have induced the introduction of the incentive. The results are in Table 12 . In all three panels, the results are similar to those in Table 9 , although a little smaller in magnitude. Thus, we conclude that mean reversion is unlikely to be driving our results.
Competition
Presence of Southwest Airlines
Another concern with our results is that they might be driven by a competitive response to an entering airline, specifically Southwest Airlines. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) show that incumbent carriers respond to the threat of entry by Southwest Airlines by cutting fares preemptively. Prince and Simon (2015) examine whether incumbents adjust their quality provision in response to entry and entry threats in the airline industry: specifically, they assess how incumbent airlines adjust their on-time performance in response to entry and entry threats by a particularly active (potential) entrant, Southwest Airlines. They find that incumbents' on-time performance actually worsens in response to entry and entry threats by Southwest. Since Southwest is known to have the best on-time performance of major carriers, it is also possible that other carriers might improve on-time performance in response to the threat of entry by Southwest. To address this possibility, in Table   13 , Panel A, we exclude Southwest and all routes on which Southwest operates. The results are essentially unchanged relative to Table 9 , although the magnitude of the coe cient when a carrier has an incentive is larger. Thus, our results are not driven by the presence of Southwest Airlines.
To further examine the impact of Southwest Airlines, in Table 13 , Panel B, we introduce an additional independent variable for the year that Southwest entered a route. 20 In the first column, in the year that Southwest entered a route, arrival delays drop by 0.64 minutes independent of all other e↵ects. Having an incentive also reduces arrival delays by 0.40 minutes, a similar magnitude to what we find in Table 9 . We find similar e↵ects for departure delays and the percentage of flights delayed fifteen minutes or more. In sum, while Southwest's presence does reduce delays, Southwest Airlines does not explain our on-time incentive results. Instead, the e↵ect of an on-time incentive seems to be similar in magnitude to the competitive pressure other carriers experience when Southwest enters a route.
Capacity and Prices
In addition to the strategic gaming of scheduled times discussed before, it is also possible that carriers could reduce capacity in response to on-time arrival incentives. The idea here is that having more flights and passengers increases the likelihood of delays, either because it takes longer to board more passengers, longer to fuel flights that are more fully loaded, or because with more flights scheduled, any delays will compound throughout the airline system. Therefore, in order to make it easier to achieve an on-time bonus, carriers might reduce capacity. Table 14 The fourth and fifth columns consider departures scheduled and departures performed. An 20 In this specification, we do not impose the restriction that a carrier operate on a route before and after the introduction of an incentive, as this would eliminate our ability to examine entry into routes by Southwest.
21 These results are sensitive to the inclusion of origin · year and destination · year fixed e↵ects, which absorb much of the variation. Excluding these fixed e↵ects, we find that load factors increase for all three incentive categories relative to no incentive, consistent with Dana and Orlov (2014) , who find that over our sample period, load factors for airlines have consistently increased.
incentive-initiating airline insignificantly decreases its departures scheduled and performed. The rival airline on the same routes decreases its departures scheduled and performed by three percent.
If both have an incentive, then departures scheduled and performed decrease by ten percent. These results suggest that the increases in flights scheduled and performed in Table 3 , Panel A, for Rivals and Joint are explained by our control variables, in particular origin · year and destination · year fixed e↵ects, and are not attributable to the introduction of on-time incentives. The primary conclusion from Table 14 is that airlines do not reduce capacity in response to the introduction of an incentive. If anything, airlines with incentives increase capacity and passengers, and yet still show improvement in on-time arrivals.
To complete the picture of how on-time incentives a↵ect competition, we also consider the impact on prices. Our previous results suggest that competition between airlines in on-time performance is competition in strategic complements, and that introducing an on-time incentive toughens competition. We also see that airlines with an incentive increase capacity on their routes.
Column 6 of Table 14 shows the e↵ect on fares by route when a carrier has an incentive. In this specification, we additionally control for the presence of Southwest and other low cost carriers.
Here we find that carriers with an incentive have fares that are lower by one percent. Rivals with an incentive have no impact on fares, and there is no e↵ect if both a carrier and its rivals have an incentive. While we do find that the incentive is associated with a carrier having lower fares, consistent with the incentive being part of toughening competition by a carrier, the e↵ect is small in magnitude. A carrier introducing an incentive is associated with a reduction in delays, a small increase in quantities, and a small reduction in prices.
Conclusion
We find that airlines reduce the length and frequency of arrival delays in response to the introduction of on-time arrival bonuses for their executives. Because these bonuses were staggered in their introduction across airlines over our 18 year sample period, we are able to identify the e↵ect of the bonus on arrival delays. Because on-time arrival is an important quality metric for passengers and airlines, we can directly observe the impact of an incentive on the outcome variable it is meant to influence.
We find evidence that part of the improvement in on-time performance comes from strategic gaming by airlines, especially when incentives are more high-powered; that is, when the on-time arrival incentive is a larger fraction of the total bonus. We are able to isolate the strategic gaming e↵ect most precisely in our di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis. While most airlines reduce departure delays in response to the introduction of incentives (and therefore reduce arrival delays), we do find some instances of airlines simply adjusting the scheduled length of their flights. Nonetheless, for most airlines, most of the improvement comes from the reduction in departure delays (getting airplanes out of the gate on-time).
We find some evidence that competitors increase their on-time arrival performance in response to a rival introducing an incentive, even if the competitor does not have an on-time arrival incentive in place. This suggests that competition in quality is competition in strategic complements.
Overall, our evidence suggests that incentives work as intended when there is clear observability and measurability of performance goals. Statistics for arrival and departure delays (minutes), and di↵erence between scheduled and actual flight times. None= 1 for observations in which no carrier has an incentive. Own= 1 for observations in which the carrier has an incentive, and Rivals= 1 for observations in which a carrier faces a rival that has an incentive. Joint= 1 for observations in which a carrier and at least one rival in a route have an incentive. For Own, Rival, and Joint, a carrier must serve a route before and after it implements the incentive. The categorical variables None, Own, Rivals, and Joint are defined as in Table 2 . Panel A summarize seats per scheduled flights, enplaned passengers per performed flights, load factor, and departures scheduled and performed.
All carriers included in the sample serve the route at least 8 times a month (minimum number of scheduled and performed departures is 24 for a year-quarter-route-carrier), and serves a route both before and after the carrier introduced an incentive. Part 1 includes all such routes, and Part 2 restricts the sample to "problem routes," (those where the carrier that introduces an incentive reports at least 30% of flights arrive at least 15 minutes delayed prior to the introduction of the incentive). Panel B reports ticket-price statistics. Part 1 includes all routes, while part 2 restricts the sample to problem routes. For each route-carrier and year quarter observation, we have a random sample of 10% of all itineraries fares. The average fare reported here under each categorical variable is the average P ricejrq across carriers, routes and year quarter observation falling in each category. Capacity data is from the T100-Domestic Segment of Form 41 merged with the Ontime Performance data. Price data is from the DB1B databases.
All databases are from the BTS. We estimate a dynamic staggered di↵erence in di↵erence regression of the type:
Where Pjrt is one of three on-time measures for carrier j in route r during year-quarter t: non-negative arrival or departure delays and padding time (CRS time minus actual elapsed flight time). Quarterq is an indicator equal to one for the q th quarter relative to the introduction of the on-time incentive. Treatedjq is an indicator variable equal to 1 if carrier j is treated (the incentive is implemented) at quarter 0. The time window is four quarters before the incentive was implemented to four quarters after it was introduced (the quarter the incentive was implemented is therefore excluded). To control for the presence of a competitor in a route we include kInRoutert, which equals 1 if carrier k serves route r at time t. urj are route-carrier fixed e↵ects, ut are year-quarter fixed e↵ects, uoy are origin · year fixed e↵ects, and u dy are destination · year fixed e↵ects. Log(Total Compensation) is included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the route-carrier level. The coe cient estimates of ↵ k represent the change in minutes in performance due to the introduction of an incentive k quarters away. To illustrate the dynamic e↵ect of introducing the incentive on on-time performance, Figure 1 plots the coe cients ↵ k .
The dashed lines around the coe cient estimates represent the 95% confidence interval, adjusted for route-carrier clustering. Exogeneity of the on-time performance incentive is confirmed by ↵q = 0, 8q < 0. 
We estimate a generalized (staggered) di↵erence-in-di↵erence specification of the type:
Pjrt is an on-time measures for carrier j, in route r, at time t. P ostjt equals 1 if the observation year-quarter t is after carrier j implemented the incentive. Incentivej equals 1 if observation carrier j implements an on-time arrival incentive within the sample window. The di↵erence-in-di↵erence variable is DIDjt = Incentivej · P ostjt. To control for the presence of a competitor in a route we include kInRoutert, which equals 1 if carrier k serves route r at time t. Both panels include route-carrier fixed e↵ects, urj, and year-quarter fixed e↵ects, ut. Panel A includes origin · year fixed e↵ects, uoy, and destination · year fixed e↵ects, u dy . Panel B replaces uoy and u dy with origin and destination time trends (Originrt · T imetrend and Destrt · T imetrend), where T imetrend takes a value between 1 and 72 corresponding to each quarter in our sample. The reported coe cient is ↵DID. Log(Total Compensation) is included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors, clustered at the route-carrier level, are in parentheses.
Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % level: ***, **, and * respectively. Origin and Dest Timetrends X X X X X X X X X Cluster Route-Carrier X X X X X X X X X
For each treated carrier we run a di↵erence-in-di↵erence regression, using a sample restricted to the four quarters before and four quarters after the treated carrier introduces the incentive. We also restrict the sample to control carriers that do not have an incentive during the selected time window. A carrier must serve the route before and after the treated carrier introduces the incentive (a carrier not serving a route both before and after the incentive is dropped, but the route remains in the sample as long as some carrier serves it both before and after the incentive). Each regression specification is of the type:
Pjrt is one of three performance measures: Minutes of arrival and departure delays and padding time. Carrierj equals 1 if the observation corresponds to carrier j ; Af terjt equals 1 if the observation corresponds to the time window after carrier j implements the incentive; Carrierj · Af terjt is the interaction term for a carrier following its implementation of an on-time performance incentive. The error term is ⇣jrt. The reported coe cient is the di↵erence in di↵erence ↵DID. Log(Total Compensation) is included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by route carrier. Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % level indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
We estimate the di↵erence in di↵erence specification defined in Table 6 for di↵erent sub-samples. The reported coe cient is ↵DID. Panel A: Sample is restricted to routes served by the treated carrier before and after its incentive, and at least one other carrier serves that same route both before and after the treated carrier introduces the incentive (the treated carrier competes with the same rival(s) before and after implementing the incentive). Panel B: Sample restricted to routes served by only one carrier before and after a carrier introduces the incentive (routes where treated and control carriers are monopolists). In Panel C, the treated sample consists of routes served by a carrier (B) with no incentive on which it competes with another carrier (A) with an incentive, and the control sample consists of routes served by carrier (B) on which it does not compete with a carrier (A) with an incentive, before and after carrier (A)
introduces an incentive. Log(Total Compensation) is included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by route carrier. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. We estimate a di↵erence in di↵erence model of the type defined in Table 6 for the di↵erent sub-samples defined in Table 7 . The dependent variable is the fraction of flights delayed by 15 minutes or more. The reported coe cient is ↵DID. Log(Total Compensation) is included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors clustered by route-carrier are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
